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ABSTRACT  
This paper presents empirical evidence on the extent to which FTAs are “contagious”, 
using empirical techniques inspired by the study of contagion in exchange rate crises. 
Applying a series of different econometric techniques, it tests the null hypothesis that the 
signing of an FTA between one nation’s trade partners has no affect on the probability of the 
nation signing a new FTA. The hypothesis is tested against other political, economical and 
geographical determinants of the FTA formation previously stated in the literature, finding 
evidence that the contagion phenomenon is present in different specifications and samples.  
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Free trade agreements (FTA) are being signed at a rapid pace. A central question for the trade system 
is: Why is bilateralism and regionalism spreading so rapidly? Some, starting with Krugman (1991a), 
link the spread of regionalism to slow progress in multilateral talks, a view recently embraced by 
Bhagwati (2008).  
While this correlation between slow multilateralism and fast regionalism is intuitively appealing in 
recent years and for the years preceding the 1994 Uruguay Round agreement, it does not square well 
with data over a longer period. Over the past two decades, the pace of regionalism is not closely tied to 
the ebb and flow of multilateral talks. As the raw numbers in Figure 1 show, it is not clear that the 
number of deals accelerated when multilateral talks stalled between 1990 and 1994. Indeed it seems that 
the trend picked up just after the Uruguay Round agreement was struck in 1994. Likewise, the recent 
problems with the on-going Doha talks coincide with a slight decline in the rate of growth.  
 Figure 1: Explosion of FTAs, North-North, North-South and South-South, 1958-2007 
Source: WTO RTA database, www.wto.org. 
 
The Krugman-Bhagwati explanation also has little to say about the clear geographical pattern in new 
agreements. As  Figure 2 shows, the spread of regionalism is far from homogenous across regions. 
Before 1976, Europe dominated, in the 1976-1990 period, the Americas dominated and in 1991-1999, 
the Former Soviet bloc nations dominated. Plainly, a global-wide explanation does not account for this 
regional variation in an obvious manner. This regional pattern suggests contagion – much like the 
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 Figure 2: Geographic pattern of FTAs: Region-specific waves 
 
This paper improve previous studies on the determinants of FTA introducing empirical techniques 
similar to the used to identify the transmission channels of financial crisis contagion, finding that there 
is evidence of  “contagion effect” in the proliferation of FTA in recent years.  
The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. The next section, Section 2, briefly reviews the 
theoretical frameworks that inform our empirics and summarizes relevant literature. Section 3 describes 
the unprecedented dataset of FTA that we will use and our measure of contagion. In Section 4 we 
present the main results of the empirical analysis in both a cross sectional and a panel data framework 
and the respective robustness checks. The final section contains our concluding remarks.  
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RELEVANT LITERATURE  
2.1. Theoretical considerations  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the domino theory of regionalism (Baldwin 1993, 1995, 1997). The 
basic idea has two parts. First, trade diversion, or the threat of it, creates de novo political economy 
urges in third nations. These new forces favour pro-FTA forces and thus may tilt the balance towards a 
“yes” decision in nations that previously found it politically optimal to abstain. This is the first-round 
effect. The second round comes if new nations actually sign new FTAs as this then increases the threat 
of trade diversion on third nations. That is, the signing of agreements creates a sort of political economy 
momentum that can make it seem that FTAs are ‘contagious’, spreading like wildfire as it were.  
The idea underlying the domino mechanism is an old one. A version can be distilled from the account 
in Chapter 5 of Viner (1950) of how dozens of German principalities and city-states were cajoled and 
coerced into joining Prussia's Zollverien. Whalley (1993) also views Western Hemispheric regionalism 4 
as largely defensive (rather than US-led). He, however, focuses on fears of US protectionism instead of 
trade diversion, and he does not posit a circular causality between bloc size and the strength of 
inclusionary pressures. Hufbauer (1989) uses the term “FTA magnetism” which captures the first step 
(idiosyncratic deepening sparks membership requests) but does not relate the strength of the magnetism 
to the bloc size. The formal model of the domino theory of regionalism was first presented in Baldwin 
(1993a) which was published as Baldwin (1995)
1. Winters (1996) and Lawrence (1996) surveys 
regionalism and multilateralism models, putting the domino theory in perspective.  
The main alternate hypotheses are: 1) the FTA-vs-MTN hypothesis; 2) the bandwagon effect; and 3) 
the spread of democracy. The first suggests a complementarity between progress in multilateral trade 
talks and progress in regional trade agreements. The second suggests a very general ‘demonstration 
effect’ whereby nations sign FTAs because they see other nations signing them. The third stated that 
democratic countries are prone to sign FTA. These hypotheses could explain the wave like spread of 
regionalism. The key empirical lever that allows us to distinguish them from the contagion hypothesis is 
the extent to which trade ties connect the new FTA signers. The contagion hypothesis works on trade 
diversion, so the spread of FTAs should follow a pattern that is clearly related to the new signers’ trade 
patterns. In particular, a pair of nations should be more likely to sign a new FTA, if either of them has 
recently signed FTAs with third nations that in which the pair’s exporters are rivals.  
2.2. Literature: Empirical analysis of FTA formation  
Even the discussion about the determinants of FTA can be track back to Viner’s contributions in the 
mid XX century, is in the early 1990s when become an important issue in International Trade. The focal 
question in this literature is: Why are countries eager to open markets bilaterally or regionally but 
reluctant to do so multilaterally? While trade policy scholars have proposed a number of explanations
2, 
and some of these explanations have been formalized by theorists
3, in the empirical side there is just 
few contributions. The Membership to FTA was typically taken as exogenous in empirical 
specifications, but recently researchers have started to view it as an endogenous phenomenon and have 
begun to explore its determinants. 
The first systematic empirical study on the determinants of a FTA is Baier and Bergstrand (2004), 
which use worldwide data to estimate cross sectional linear probability models, stressing that economic 
factors seems to be enough to predict must of the agreements. In particular, they find that the likelihood 
of an FTA between a country pair is higher the closer they are, the more distant from the rest of the 
world, the larger and more similar their economic size are and the more different their labour ratios are 
(Heckscher-Ohlin trade). 
Some previous empirical studies have already put emphasis in the “domino effect” as determinant of 
FTA, focusing in trade diversion as a key determinant in the willingness of membership to the European 
Union. A first attempt is Sapir (1997), which estimates year-by-year cross-section gravity models and 
finds that trade diversion tends to spike in a time pattern that explains tend to EU enlargements. 
                                                           
1 See Baldwin (1994, 1997, 2002, 2006) for applications of it to European, Western Hemisphere and Asian 
domino effects. 
2  Anderson and Blackhurst (1993), Krugman (1993), Bhagwati (1993), Whalley (1996), Lawrence (1996), 
Bergsten (1996), Panagariya (1996), inter alia.  
3 Grossman and Helpman (1995), Yi (1996), Ethier (1996), Bond and Syropoulos (1996), Yi (1996), Winters 
(1996), Levy (1997), Fernandez and Portes (1998), Krishna (1998), Freund (2000), Mclaren (2002), and Aghion, 
Antras and Helpman (2004). 5 
Baldwin and Rieder (2007) follow a similar strategy but estimating trade creation and diversion in a 
panel setting to then use the results for calculate the likelihood to become a EU member.   
Some studies have focused in aspects beyond the economic determinants. Mansfield and Reinhardt 
(2003) offer a more political explanation, arguing that one of the main determinants of regional trade 
agreements are developments at the multilateral level, with difficulties in GATT/WTO negotiations 
prompt countries to engage in regionalism. Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2002) empirically find 
that pairs of democratic countries are more likely to form a FTA, a result confirmed by Wu (2004) that 
also claims that economic and trade uncertainty matter. After determining FTA that are effectively 
implemented, Holmes (2005) show evidence of “mercantile interests” in assuring export market access 
are a important determinants.  
2.3. Literature: Contagious crisis and policies  
  Dungey et al. (2004) review the empirical models of contagion in macro crisis literature, classifying 
the methodologies in: latent factor; correlation analysis; vector autoregression (VAR); co-exceedance 
approach and probability models. Our work is mainly related with the latter approach, developed in the 
work by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1996), where a dichotomic measure of crisis is the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variable is the same measure for the rest of the countries, using 
trade and macro weights in order to analyse the channels of contagion. Using probit estimations they 
provide evidence of an increase in the probability of the occurrence of a crisis if there is a crisis 
somewhere else.  
This approach is expanded by Novo (2004) to a multivariate framework in which multiple countries 
can be infected and their relative contagious influence is measured by a spatial weights matrix.    
Some studies have extended the contagion analysis to economic policies. Elkins et al. (2004) argue 
that the diffusion of Bilateral Investments Treaties (BIT) is driven by international competition for FDI 
among potential host countries, then the likelihood of sign a BIT increase with the number of competing 
countries that have done so. Gassebner et al. (2008) examines if country’s economic reforms are 
affected by the reforms adopted in the rest of the world. They find that cultural and geographical 
proximity tend to be factors in the contagion of reforms, but that trade links are not.      
3. DATA DESCRIPTION: FTA AND CONTAGION INDEX 
3.1. Free Trade Agreements 
The phenomenon we are investigating is the signing of new FTA, so the ‘left hand variable’ is a 
digital measure reflecting it existence (unity if yes and zero if no). We use the recently available 
Preferential Trade Agreements Database from the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the 
World Trade Institute (WTI), constructed using the historical notifications of the date the agreements 
entered into force and their contemporary participants. This source is the most extensive and detailed 
currently available; it is more comprehensive than the WTO database which is based only on 
agreements notified to the institution. The database has 570 agreements recorded from 1948 to 2007; of 
these, 329 agreements were still force in 2007.  
We limit the period of investigation to 2005 due to lack of comprehensive data on our ‘right hand 
side’ variables.  6 
Table 1 summarises the FTAs. Europe dominates the FTAs with a total of 224, almost half of them 
signed in the 90s. The source of Europe’s dominance in these figures is well known. Starting from the 
formation of the EEC in the 1950s and EFTA in 1960, the engagement between these groups and the 
enlargement of the former created a large number of FTA as has the external FTA engagement of the 
two blocks. In the Americas, 154 agreements have been signed including NAFTA, MERCOSUR and 
numerous bilateral FTAs among their countries. The Former Soviet Bloc nations, that we report 
separately, subscribed to numerous agreements during the 90s reaching a total of 124 in 2005. The 
Middle East and North Africa have 83 deals, while Asia has 54. The least dynamic region is Sub-
Saharan Africa with ‘just’ 41 agreements in total, half of them coming from before 1976.  
















World  Country 
pairs 
Before 1976  22  20  8  42  11  1  83  326 
1976-1990 4  42  8  14  10  6  66  221 
1991-1999 3  48  9  100  31  93  229  495 
2000-2005 12  44  29  68  31  24  159  236 
Total 41  154  54  224  83  124 570  1319 
Source: WTI Database. Asia includes East and South Asia and Oceania. Europe includes Turkey. In the regional disaggregation the 
agreements are computed more than one time when the subscribers belong to different regions. 
Our unit of study is the country-pair formation of FTA, a number which has evolved as shown in the 
next-to-last column of the table. A cumulative total of 1319 country-pair trade deals are registered up to 
2005, but just 1134 are still in force or signed for later implementation. That means that around 17% of 
the pairs of countries are covered by some sort of trade agreement in the year 2005. Among these 
agreements, 65% are classified as pure Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and the others are partial scope 
agreements, currency unions and the like.  Nevertheless, to avoid linguistic infelicities, we refer to all 
them as FTAs.  
For our analysis we will use all types of registered agreements, either in force or signed, since our 
prior is that the contagion effect is produced at the moment the agreement is created. The idea is that the 
threat of trade diversion is as important as actual trade diversion. Nevertheless, in the robustness check 
section we show that the use of a stricter definition of FTA do not alter the main results. In Appendix 1 
we present the total number of FTAs signed by each country in the sample used in our empirics. The 
agreements are reduced to a total of 782 in 2005 when the data is cleaned. 
3.2. Measure of contagion 
Following the probability model of contagious currency crisis, a key element of our empirical 
approach is a measure of “infection”. But here is going to appear an important difference between 
contagion episodes in macro crisis and in the FTA formation: while the former are temporary events, 
the latter are, in most of the cases, a permanent condition. A consequence of this difference is that the 
measure we have to use is not just an addition over the infected countries, but also an accumulation over 
the time.    
In the case of contagion come from the threat of trade diversion, or loss of export competitiveness, 
two elements must be considered. Firstly, the number of FTAs signed by other countries (the more the 
infected, the most likely to be tainted). Second, the relative distance to other countries subscribing FTAs 7 
(the closest to the infected, the most exposed to contagion). Considering this, we propose the following 











So in a given year t the index for country i with respect to j is the accumulated sum of the FTAs 
signed by j with the countries outside the pair in the past years, weighted by the commercial  
importance of the third countries to i, measured as the share of total exports to this country
4.  
This one-way contagion index can be better understood with the example illustrated in Figure 3. In 
2005 Australia and Malaysia started the studies and negotiations to establish a FTA. Can this fact be 
related with a contagion effect? The contagion from Malaysia to Australia is measured by the 
cumulative of trade-weighted shares of Malaysia’s FTAs. The trade weights are Australia’s export 
shares to the third-nation with whom Malaysia has a deal, and to reduce simultaneity, the share is fixed 
at the time of FTA was signed. Ignoring the evolution of trade shares, it measures the share of 
Australian exports that go to nations with which Malaysia has an FTA.  
 
Figure 3: One-way contagion index 
 







(2005), weighted by 
Australia China trade 
share
ASEAN FTA 
(1992), weighted by 
Australia ASEAN 
trade share
                                                           
4 The data on export shares is taken from COMTRADE. One possible concern with the total export 
shares as weight is the fact that some FTA cover just a number of industries, so only these sectors are 
threaded by the potential trade diversion, and only the export share of these industries might be used as 
the weight in the contagion indexes.  Even this concern is true, our database do not have information on 
the specific sectors covered by the FTA. Moreover, our prior is that even one sector is not included in 
the original FTA, the fact that the agreement was signed create the threat that the sector can be included 
in the future.  
 8 
Up to 2005, Malaysia has signed three FTAs with countries in our sample: ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangements with Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1978
5; ASEAN 
expansion including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1992; ASEAN-China Agreement on 
Trade in Goods in 2005. On the other hand, in the year the FTAs were established the export shares of 
Australia to the signers were 6%, 0.1% and 4%, respectively. Then, the Contagion Index of Australia 
from Malaysia is the accumulation over the time of the shares, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Contagion Index of Australia from Malaysia 
 
Of course, it takes two to dance, when it comes to signing FTAs, so we must also consider the 
contagion of Australia on Malaysia. Considering the dyadic nature of the data, in the empirical 
exercises we do this in two ways: some specifications are with directed dyads, so two observations per 
country-pair are included for each year (one for the country as recipient and other as giver), and the 
Contagion Index is directly plugged.  In the rest of the specifications, one observation per dyad is 
included, implying that a symmetric measure should be used. In this case, we take the two one-way 
Contagion Indexes for each country-pair and build three indicators
6: (1) the arithmetic average of the 
indexes for ij and ji; (2) the maximum of these indexes, related with effect of the most infected country; 
(3) the minimum of these indexes, related with the decision of the less infected country. The average of 
the three contagion indicators by country in 2005 is summarized in Appendix 1.  
There are some potential endogeneity problems since the index depends upon actual trade flows 
which are influenced by the matrix of FTAs. We address this in our robustness checks, where we show 
that using different samples and measures of export shares the results are unaffected. 
                                                           
5 That actually was established as a Free Trade Area just in 1992, so in the stricter definition of the 
robustness check this year will be used instead of 1978.    
6  In order to align the contagion indicators with the scale of other variables we will use in the 
regressions, the indicators are multiplied by 100.  9 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Cross-Section 
Our first approach is to study the cross sectional properties of the contagion indicators, that have to 
thought as the long-term or cumulative effect. Here we will start following the literature in the static 
determinants of the formation of FTAs between pairs of countries. The most important contribution in 
the area is the study by Baier and Bergstrand (2004, B&B henceforth) that amply a qualitative choice 
model to show the main economic variables underlying the FTAs accumulated up to a giving year. The 




where the probability to sign a FTA will be determined by the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function of a linear specification, G(*),  that ensures the result lies between 0 and 1. Xij is a 
vector of time invariant explanatory variables related to the country-pair and β the related coefficients. 
We expand this specification by introducing the contagion indicators to estimate models for the year 




where Contagionij2005 is the accumulated value of one of the contagion indicators up to 2005 and  γ is 
the parameter of interest.  
For the sake of comparability, we first estimate the results in a reduced sample similar to the one used 
by B&B (and later expand the analysis to the entire database). The reduced sample is composed by 52 
countries and 1303 country-pairs, of which 372 have a FTA in force or signed in 2005.
7 This sub-
sample has important advantages. With long series of export data available to build the contagion 
indexes for these countries, our results are not be driven by discontinuous declaration of data in exports 
or the creation/extinction of a country. Almost the full range of possible pairings are covered (the 
possible country-pairs are 52 time 51 divided by 2, i.e. 1326).   
  In the first panel of Table 2 we present the result of the probit estimation of the model. The first 
column shows a very important fact: when just one explaining variable is included, “natural partners” 
measure with the inverse of the countries geographical distance, a great deal of the FTAs can be 
predicted as showed in the Correct Classification Rates (CCR)
8, with around 85% of accuracy and a 
pseudo-R
2 of 0.456. Adding more economic and cultural determinants do little to improve the efficiency 
of the estimations. In column 2 a measure of remoteness from the rest of the world, the product and 
ratio of the logs of GDPs (proxies for economic size and its differences respectively) and the ratio 
                                                           
7 In B&B there are 54 countries and 1431 pairings, of which 286 have a PTA. The 2 countries that we 
miss are Iraq and Nigeria due to lack of updated data availability. In Table Appendix 1 the countries 
that integrate the reduced sample are identified.  
8 We present values of the CCR based in two cut-off points. First the one used by B&B and most of 
the previous literature, that assigns value 1 to the predicted probabilities over one half and 0 below and 
then compute the correct predicted values comparing with the dependent variable. The alternative 
measure takes the population mean as the cut-off point, which, in the case of the cross-section in 2005, 
implies assign 1 to predicted values over 0.83, because 17% of the country pairs are covered by a FTA.   10 
                                                          
capital/labour are included
9, with just slightly improvements in accuracy. The determinants in column 2 
are the same as in the final empirical specification of B&B, and we obtain similar signs, magnitudes and 
significance than them for all the parameters, with the exception of the one related with the 
capital/labour ratio
10.  In column 3 we explore some shared cultural characteristics between the 
countries in the pair that could be important to determinant the existence FTAs, namely common 
language, a past colonial relationship and common colonizer (dropped by colinearity in this 
specification). B&B disregard this type of determinants, but, in opposition, we find that common 
language has a positive and significant effect, and that slightly improve the efficiency of the model, a 
result confirmed in later exercises.  
In the last columns of the first panel the values for the three contagion indicators for 2005 are 
included. In order to follow B&B original specification, undirected dyads (one observation per dyad) 
are estimated, and the symmetric contagion indicators are used. Column 4 shows that the indicator that 
averages the country-pair contagion indexes has a positive and significant impact in the probability to 
sign a FTA, with an improvement of five percentage points in the pseudo-R
2. The coefficients for 
contagion indicators for the maximum and minimum index, in columns 5 and 6 respectively, also are 
positive and significant, and increase significantly the goodness of fit with respect to the first 
specifications. Together, these results provide a first evidence of the relevance of contagion effect that 
should anyhow be taken with care, considering that the pseudo-R
2 is a ratio of likelihoods with no direct 
interpretation, as also happen with the probit coefficients that just inform about sign and significance.  
The second panel of the Table 2 shows the results of estimate the cross-sectional probability model 
for FTAs in the whole sample. Even we tried to have a sample as large as possible, some depurations 
must be performed. In order to properly compute the contagion indicators, enough information for the 
export shares should be available, so we drop countries with information of exports for less than 45 
destinations. Also some countries are eliminated for lack of information in some of the other variables 
used in the estimation. After this cleaning process, we end up with a sample of 112 countries and 4661 
pairings, of which 782 have a FTA. Column 7 shows that the sole variable “natural partners” is still 
enough to have a good prediction for the FTAs, as measured by the CCR, but has a lower goodness of 
fit that in the B&B sample. When the other economic and cultural determinants are included (column 8) 
similar results that in the reduced sample are obtained, with the difference that now the capital/labour  
 
9 All the definitions and sources are in Appendix 2.   
10 We use the same data of B&B to measure this ratio, coming from Baier et al. (2000). The results 
related to this parameter are the only ones that change considerably in sign and significance with the 
different sample and model specifications we tried; in particular, most specifications give us negative 
and significant estimates for this variable.  11 
Table 2: Cross Section Results 




    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) 
COEFFICIENT  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA  All FTA 
contagion  (average)        0.0371***         0.0227***      
          (0.0044)         (0.0020)      
contagion  (max)        0.0319***         0.0158***     
          (0.0028)         (0.0011)     
contagion  (min)         0.0315***         0.0315***   
           (0.0029)         (0.0016)   
Contagion  Index                  0.0283*** 
                  (0.0015) 
natural  1.277***  0.969*** 0.997*** 0.811*** 0.710*** 0.548***  1.113*** 1.050***  0.923***  0.862*** 0.697***  1.577*** 
    (0.0664)  (0.0934) (0.0940) (0.0939) (0.0980) (0.0958)  (0.0385) (0.0507)  (0.0522)  (0.0544) (0.0555)  (0.1014) 
remoteness    0.0826*** 0.0696*** 0.0671*** 0.0739*** 0.0765***    0.0333***  0.0332***  0.0427*** 0.0415***  0.0698*** 
      (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0187) (0.0190)    (0.0090)  (0.0093)  (0.0095) (0.0101)  (0.0175) 
product  GDP    0.116*** 0.143*** 0.133***  0.0898***  0.116***    0.159***  0.147***  0.134*** 0.0947***  0.242*** 
      (0.0187) (0.0209) (0.0221) (0.0238) (0.0221)    (0.0118)  (0.0126)  (0.0129) (0.0141)  (0.0237) 
ratio GDP    -0.102***  -0.106***  -0.0272  0.0485  -0.00284    -0.0738***  -0.0815***  -0.0752***  -0.0187  -0.113*** 
      (0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0368) (0.0391) (0.0372)    (0.0184)  (0.0194)  (0.0199) (0.0206)  (0.0371) 
ratio K/L     -0.0267  -0.0143  -0.105  -0.0617  -0.168**    -0.0791***  -0.101***  -0.0926***  -0.0808**  -0.150*** 
      (0.0649) (0.0629) (0.0690) (0.0753) (0.0765)    (0.0266)  (0.0286)  (0.0296) (0.0326)  (0.0562) 
common language      0.430***  0.739***  0.984***  0.862***    0.807***  0.896***  0.956***  1.035***  1.750*** 
       (0.1335)  (0.1374)  (0.1696)  (0.1307)    (0.0753)  (0.0762)  (0.0786)  (0.0755)  (0.1361) 
colony     -0.00934  -0.187  -0.259  -0.288    0.00821  0.0107  0.0453  -0.0840  0.0233 
       (0.3081)  (0.2845)  (0.3248)  (0.2797)    (0.1896)  (0.1938)  (0.2033)  (0.1904)  (0.3527) 
common  colonizer            0.327***  0.413***  0.366***  0.260**  0.660*** 
              (0.1002)  (0.1013)  (0.1061)  (0.1018)  (0.1844) 
Observations  1303  1303 1303 1303 1303 1303  4661 4661  4661  4661 4661  9322 
Countries  52  52 52 52 52 52  112  112 112 112  112  112 
CCR (cut-off=0.5)  0.883  0.889 0.890 0.897 0.908 0.899  0.869 0.889 0.889 0.891 0.918   
CCR (cut-off=pop. mean)  0.847  0.862 0.861 0.869 0.877 0.866  0.845 0.859  0.865  0.863  0.888   
Pseudo  R2  0.456  0.485 0.492 0.536 0.612 0.588  0.349 0.427  0.456  0.478 0.559   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 12 
ratio is negative and significant, and the dummy for common colonizer is positive and significant. 
When contagion indicators are added (columns 9 to 11) a significant improvement in the goodness of fit 
is achieved, particularly in the case of the indicator for the minimum contagion in the pair. The three 
indicators are positive and significant.   
In the last panel of the table we present results for the directed dyadic regression, implying that the 
number of observations are the double that in the undirected dyads specification. The direct Contagion 
Index is estimated, allowing for asymmetry in the effect. The structure of the errors in this specification 
is very particular, with blocks created for the interaction of the different members of the dyad with the 
rest of the countries that violate the homoskedastic assumption
11. To obtain the correct specification for 
the errors, we use the correction proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). The results are similar to 
the obtained with the undirected dyads specification, with a positive and statistically significative 
Contagion Index.  
4.2. Robustness checks for cross section 
In the estimations presented in the last section, the contagion indexes are defined in the way showed 
in Section 2, using as weights the export shares with a third country in the year the FTA is signed with 
it. Even this specification alleviates a great deal of the simultaneity problem presented in most of 
empirical specification that relates FTAs and partner trading relevance, since the export share of the 
countries in the pair is never present, still some endogeneity problems could be biasing the estimates. 
The fact that a pair of countries has signed a FTA can affect the share of exports to third countries in 
different ways. The most obvious endogeneity is produced when a bloc is created, since in the same 
year a pair signs the agreement some of the main trading partners will be doing the same, then the 
exports shares to the members in the bloc will increase and the contagion index will be endogenous. To 
alleviate this problem we re-estimate the direct dyadic specifications in the last panel of Table 2
12 
dropping the country-pairs formed by founder members of one of three blocs: EU9 (the EU members 
before 1976), MERCOSUR and ASEAN. The first column of Table 3 shows that basic results do not 
change in the new sample (control’s parameters are not displayed).    
But the effects of FTAs are more complex. As shown in the theoretical discussion of the domino 
effect, trade creation matters as well as trade diversion. Thus even trade shares of third countries that 
are not part of a bloc get affected when a FTA is signed, and, if eventually they joint later, the weights 
in the contagion index will contain an endogenous component. In order to definitively deal with this 
potential problem we take a more radical solution. We recalculate the contagion index, but using as 
weights the trade shares in the first year of the time series, 1976. The backdrop is a decrease in the 
dynamic nature of the indicators, but exogeneity is strengthened, especially since we drop all country-
pairs with FTAs in this year.  The regressions with is displayed in the second column of Table 3. This 
sample contains only 72 countries (for which we have data in the initial year) and 2180 pairs. The basic 
results hold.  
 
 
                                                           
11 For further details, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007).  
12 If same procedures are applied to the undirected dyads estimates, all the results of this subsection 
are the same.  13 
 
 
We can even go more back in time, trying to eliminate any doubt due to possible endogeneity related 
with trade diversion of the FTAs of before 1976. We rebuild the indicators using the trade shares in the 
first year we could get data of exports, 1962, where the only agreement was the EU6, which pairings are 
eliminated of the specification. Column 3 of Table 3 shows the results of estimations that now get 
reduced to just 46 countries and 1578 observations. All main results hold. 
A different approach to deal with the endogeneity is to estimate “potential” export shares instead of 
the observed in reality, so the weights is the latent trade relevance of the partner due to geographical, 
cultural and economic characteristics. The methodology to estimate the potential export shares is in two 
stages
13: we first estimate a gravity equation where the dependent variable is the log of the actual 
exports volumes (measured in real US dollars) regressed against the log of the product of GDPs of the 
trade partners in a given year, including the dummy for FTA between them, country-pair fixed effects 
(that account for all common time invariant characteristics as distance, language, border, etc.) and year 
fixed effects (capturing common shocks). The second stage is to estimate the fitted export values to 
build the potential shares. Column 4 of Table 3 shows the results, with a no significant change in the 
value of the Contagion Index. Even this approach has several advantages in term of removing sources 
of endogeneity, like controlling for the change in trade shares due to agreements, we think that the real 
variable observed by the policy makers, actual trade shares, is a better weight to account for contagion 
effect. 
 
Table 3: Robustness Checks for cross sectional results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    FTA FTA FTA FTA  Pure  FTA 
Contagion Index No Blocks 
0.0284*** 
(0.0015) 
Contagion Index Weights 1976 
0.0382*** 
(0.0027) 
Contagion Index Weights 1962 
0.0399*** 
(0.0037) 
Contagion Index Gravity 
0.0330*** 
(0.0022) 
Contagion Index Pure FTA 
0.0375*** 
(0.0014) 
Observations  9234 4360 1578 9274 9322 
Countries 112  72  46  112  112 
Dyadic adjusted standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Same controls as in the last panel of Table 2 are included but showed in the table.  
 
A final robustness is related with the definition of FTA. In all the later calculations we use the broader 
definition of trade agreement available in our database, which include every kind of deals. But it’s 
possible that the contagion just happen when the agreement is actually implemented and implies real 
concessions. In Column 5 of Table 3 we present re-estimates that use the contagion index built just with 
FTA in force and defined explicitly as Free Trade Agreements in the database, same thing for the 
dependent variable. 35% of the agreements are eliminated in these estimates, but the basic results hold.   
                                                           
13 For more details of this approach, Frankel and Romer (1999) and others.  14 
4.3. Panel specification 
Even the cross sectional results of the last section are important in order to state that a contagious 
effect is relevant in the determination of FTA formation, we now move to a panel specification were the 
dynamic nature of domino effect can be better analysed.  
Estimate panel data with limited dependent variable represent several challenges. The problem of 
incidental parameters implies that the inconsistency in the estimation of fixed effects will be 
“transmitted” to estimation of parameters
14.The bias in the estimation is very severe when T is short, 
but get smaller as T increases if the number of cross sectional observations (N) is sufficiently large 
(Greene 2004). Since we have the advantage that trade panels have both big T and N, our first approa
is to estimate the panel specification of the contagion hypothesis trough pooled regressions. We have 









With the dependent variable been now the probability that a pair of countries sign a trade agreement 
in period t, conditional to the fact that such agreement did not exist in the previous period. This implies 
that the dyads with FTA before the beginning of the sample are not going to be included (notably EU 
founding members) and that the year after signing an FTA the dyad will disappear of the sample
16.  
Both the controls and the main variable of interest -the contagion index or its symmetrical measures- 
are expressed as one period lag in order to avoid some of the potential endogeneity problems. This 
specification has several advantages since allows to include various political and economic controls that 
suffer of simultaneity in the cross sectional framework.   Even more importantly, the use of lagged 
values of the contagion index alleviate a great deal of the potential endogeneity problem that arises from 
the spatial dependency of FTA formation
17.  
Since most of the specifications are going to be over the directed dyads (both observations in each 
dyad-year will be included), the structure of the errors is not homoskedastic. In order to correct for this 
fact, all the specification will cluster the standard errors at dyad level.  
Another concern with this empirical specification is the related with the problem serial correlation: 
since observations are likely to be temporally related due to duration dependence in the data, the use of 
traditional probit or logit techniques represent problems. In order to solve this issue, we include natural 
cubic spline function of the numbers of years a dyad have been without a FTA, a solution proposed by 
Beck et al, (1998).   
Some previous studies have already used similar panel specification to analyse the formation of FTA, 
and among those the most important is Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003, M&R henceforth). As first 
                                                           
14 For more details, Baltagi (2005)  
15 Greene (2004) shows that, using Monte Carlo simulations, the bias of imposing fixed effects by 
brutal force in panels with limited dependent variable is around 7% when T=20 and N=1000.  
16 One concern to this specification is that values different than zero are rare events in the dependent 
variable, implying possible loss of power and bias in the estimation. In order to address this problem, 
we re-estimate all the main regressions using the methodology proposed by King and Zeng (2001) to 
solve the problem, and all the main results do not change. These results are available upon request.  
17 See Egger and Larch (2007) for details in the solutions to the problem of interdependence of FTA 
membership.  15 
exercise, we will use the same dataset used by M&R to analyse how the contagion indexes behave in 
it
18. The main goal of M&R’s work is to empirically test the hypothesis that developments in the 
multilateral trade system encourage the formation of FTA among GATT/WTO members, an idea 
supported by  Krugman (1993) and Bhagwati (1993) among others. Particularly, they test that: (1) FTA 
are used as a way to gain bargaining power during multilateral trade rounds; (2) as the number of 
GATT/WTO members arise, the individual country power leverage within the system decrease inducing 
FTA; (3) countries involved in a GATT/WTO dispute will be more willing to sign FTA in order to 
enhance their leverage in the quarrel; and (4) a country losing a dispute will be more willing to form 
FTA that mitigate the negative impacts of the lost.  
In the first column of Table 4 we reproduce M&R results for the period 1950-1998 for the estimations 
in the directed dyads
19. The parameters estimated for the four variables associated to the multilateral 
system events just described have all positive and significative signs, supporting the M&R claim: 
detrended number of GATT/WTO members; a dummy equal 1 if a trade round is ongoing in a given 
year; a dummy equal 1 if one country in the pair lost a dispute and a dummy equal 1 if the country was 
in a dispute.   
Several other ideas related with the formation of FTA can be tested in this framework, including the 
main theories described in Section 2. The thesis that link the spread of democracy and free trade 
agreements seems to have support since the variable Democracy (built using the POLITY IV index) is 
positive and significative. The idea that smaller countries are more prone to FTA is stated by the 
negative sign in the parameter associated to GDP and that richer counties are more active in that sense 
by the positive sign associated to GDP per capita. The notion that FTA formation is more likely in 
economic downturns is backed by the negative sign in the parameter for GDP growth. Bandwagon 
effect is incorporated by M&R using the proportion of the 10 main trade partners that already have an 
FTA (“Trade Partner Coverage” in Table 4), a variable that appear with a positive and significative sign. 
More than a simple “monkeys see, monkeys do” we think that this variable represents preliminary 
evidence of the contagion effect. Finally, FTA density (proportion of dyads with and FTA in a given 
year) and its squared value are incorporated, showing a decreasing return of the gains related to the 
agreements (the negative sign is because the variable is centered in 0).  
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 we split the sample of the first column in two sub-periods: 1950-1975 
and 1976-1998, in order to study if the results are not dependent to the chosen time span. The main 
changes are that now the parameter associated to WTO members is now negative and significative, 
same for WTO round in the second period (in the first is non signicative). GDP is not significative 
anymore, while GDP per capita is negative in the first period and growth is just statistically relevant in 






                                                           
18 The dataset is available in Eric Reinhardt’s web 
page: http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/data/  and a
M&R.  
ll the variables and sources are described in 
19 When undirected dyads are estimated, the main results are unchanged. These results are available 
upon request.  16 
Table 4: Dynamic Determinants of FTA in M&R Dataset  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   m&r fta  m&r fta  m&r fta  m&r fta  fta wti  fta wti 
   1950-98  1950-75  1976-98  1976-98  1976-98  1976-98 
Contagion Index (t-1)  0.0289***  0.0104*** 
   (0.0032) (0.0025) 
WTO Members (t-1, detrended)  0.138***  -0.0974***  -0.134***  -0.0724**  -0.143***  -0.144*** 
   (0.0109)  (0.0269)  (0.0459)  (0.0351)  (0.0438)  (0.0454) 
WTO Round (t-1)  1.691***  0.0351  -1.196**  -0.971**  -2.053***  -2.119*** 
   (0.1577)  (0.1915)  (0.5808)  (0.4936)  (0.5447)  (0.5687) 
WTO Dispute Lost (t-3)  1.438***  1.944***  1.218***  1.198***  0.380**  0.407** 
   (0.1210)  (0.1621)  (0.2155)  (0.2137)  (0.1752)  (0.1768) 
WTO Dispute With Third Party (t-1)  0.769***  0.345**  0.704***  0.287  -0.304  -0.295 
   (0.1331)  (0.1595)  (0.2016)  (0.2029)  (0.1900)  (0.1897) 
Democracy (t-1)  0.0491***  0.0562***  0.205***  0.168***  0.0278**  0.0299*** 
   (0.0053)  (0.0060)  (0.0254)  (0.0197)  (0.0114)  (0.0116) 
Distance -0.674***  -0.650***  -1.039***  -0.982***  -1.155***  -1.166*** 
   (0.0272)  (0.0349)  (0.0870)  (0.0827)  (0.0840)  (0.0844) 
GDP (t-1)  -0.148***  0.0170  -0.0944  -0.240**  -0.0292  -0.0380 
   (0.0559)  (0.0794)  (0.0635)  (0.1051)  (0.0712)  (0.0704) 
GDP per capita (t-1)  0.0185***  -0.0121**  0.0514***  0.0353***  0.00862  0.00879 
   (0.0042)  (0.0056)  (0.0076)  (0.0067)  (0.0055)  (0.0054) 
GDP growth (t-1)  -0.0339***  0.00515  -0.0599***  -0.0735***  -0.0517***  -0.0497*** 
   (0.0091)  (0.0101)  (0.0146)  (0.0138)  (0.0105)  (0.0105) 
FTA density (t-1, centered)  -21.58***  -127.5***  -114.5  -105.0  -60.26***  -61.16*** 
   (2.2825)  (10.9597)  (103.3323)  (87.3383)  (13.6951)  (13.8966) 
FTA density² (t-1, centered)  -511.1***  -64.44  -1803  -1528  425.3*  466.8** 
   (67.0399)  (66.0358)  (3826.5012)  (3478.6977)  (226.3410)  (228.7370) 
Trade Partner Coverage (t-1)  3.073***  2.889***  4.319***  0.944*** 
   (0.1445)  (0.2061)  (0.3129)  (0.2053) 
Time Trend  -0.357***  1.218***  0.246***  0.0644  0.414***  0.413*** 
   (0.0230)  (0.1501)  (0.0892)  (0.0731)  (0.1291)  (0.1343) 
Observations 242917  62038  180879  101433  96237  96237 
Countries 108  74  108  94  94  94 
Pseudo R
2 0.452  0.538  0.586  0.504  0.419  0.418 
Robust standard errors clustered over dyads in parentheses. Six duration dependence splines are included, but no showed in the table.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In column 4 we now introduce a lagged value of our contagion index in order to test the hypothesis 
that FTA are contagious. As expected, the parameter associated with the index is positive and 
significative, providing preliminary evidence that in the dynamics of the FTA formation the influence 
effects of the domino theory are relevant. In this specification we have to drop the “Trade Partner 
Coverage” variable, because of its high collinearity with the contagion index (the partial pairwise 17 
correlation is around 80%), that demonstrate the previously stated idea that this variable must be 
considered as an alternative proxy for contagion
20. 
Up to now, the M&R definition of FTA has been used as the dependent variable, a measure based in 
the WTO record. We now will use our definition of FTA as dependent variable, based in the data 
described in Section 3. While in M&R 238 new FTA are registered between 1976 and 1998, in ours the 
number rises until 382, with and overlap in half of the M&R registers (122).  
In column5 of Table 4 we reproduce the regression of column 3, but now having our FTA data in the 
right hand side. The only important changes are that dispute with a third party is not significant 
anymore (driven by the change in sample size) and that GDP per capita is not significant either.  
In the last column we include again the contagion index, but now using our data for FTA formation as 
dependent variable, and the results supporting contagion effect hold.  
We now turn into the analysis of the dynamics of FTA formation in the database that we built for this 
proposes, that covers the period 1976-2005 (The countries included in the sample are listed in Appendix 
1). We updated the variables of the M&R specification and add several more controls (all the detail 
about the variables and their sources are on Appendix 2. The variables related with trade disputes at 
WTO will be updated for future versions of the paper).  
In the first column of Table 5 we replicate the specification of the last column of Table 4, but now for 
the new period and dataset. Is possible to observe that the main results hold, with the contagion index 
been positive, same for democracy, GDP is insignificant, GDP per capita positive and GDP growth 
negative. The multilateral variables are non significatives or with the wrong sign. At this respect, is 
important to note that in our sample 64% of the agreements were signed when a multilateral round was 
happening, a fact that give no indication of the multilateral hypothesis since the round cover 60% of the 
period in the sample. More importantly, by far the years with more FTA are 1984, 1993, 1995, 1998 
and 2000, of which just during the second a multilateral round was open.  
In Table 2 we add several variables to the specification. First, we test the idea that in terms of political 
system, more than having a pure democratic regime, what matters in order to form an FTA with another 
country is the “Political distance”, meaning the difference between the regimens in both countries, that 
we measure as the absolute value of the difference in the POLITY IV index for the countries in the pair. 
Some descriptive statistics can help to understand our prior. In the M&R database, for the period 1976-
1998, just 4% of the countries signing FTA were autocracies (with POLITY IV measure less than zero), 
while in our database the proportion rise to one quarter. The reasons that explain the disparity are 
related with sample composition (countries like Algeria, Jordan and Syria, that are classified as 
autocracies at the moment of sign various FTA are not in M&R database); the lack of information in 
M&R record for FTA (agreements signed the year countries like Morocco, Singapore and South Africa 
were autocracies are not registered); some of these FTA involving autocracies were signed after 1998 
(65 in total). At the same time, while the average political distance for the countries in our database is 
7.64 (7.99 in M&R database), it get reduced to 4.4 (2.94 in M&R) for countries that sign an FTA.  
In column 2 of Table 5 we show that the measure of political distance is negative and significative, a 
result that hold for different specifications, and that gives support to our idea. The measure of 
Democracy is deleted in this specification (and the following), because of it collinearity with measure of 
                                                           
20 When the contagion index and “Trade Partner Coverage” variables are together in the regressions of 
column 4 and 6 of Table 4, just the former is significant, but just at 5%, while the variables are 
separately significant at 1%. The reason why we think that “Trade Partner Coverage” is contagion and 
not bandwagon effect is because there is an economic meaning (trade diversion) that drives the FTA 
decision, over simple imitation.  18 
                                                          
political distance, but when was included was usually insignificant (and the results for political distance 
where unchanged). Finally, is worthy to note that eliminating the measure of democracy also alleviate 
the collinearity issue of this variable and GDP per capita that comes from the “modernisation 
hypothesis” (richer countries tend to be more democratic).  
Another important variable that we add to the new specification is the bilateral trade between the 
signings countries. This is with no doubt one of the main determinants of the FTA formation, but the 
obvious endogeneity in cross sectional specifications have implied that several studies do not 
incorporate it (some of the M&R specifications included trade, but the limited number of observations 
was restrictive for their sample size). We incorporate this variable as the total bilateral trade (exports 
plus imports) over recipient country GDP. As expected, the estimated parameter is positive and 
significative.   
It is very likely that countries that already have signed several FTA will be keep doing that, both 
because they have learn how to do it and because the threat of new FTA in terms of import completion 
are likely to be less. We include a variable denominated “FTA expertise”, a dummy takes value 1 if the 
country has signed more than 8 agreements
21. As expected this variable is positive and significative.    
Other controls that are included but not showed in Table 5 are: all the controls of B&B specification, 
a dummy equal one if one of the countries in the dyad is on transition from communism, a dummy for 
military alliance (that was never significative) and the FTA density.  
In columns 3 to 6 we include the same robustness measures of contagion indexes, obtaining always 
results that support the contagion hypothesis and with control variables that have same results and 
interpretation as in the basic specification.  
In column 7 we add an additional robustness measure. Up to now, in the indexes we were considering 
the trade relevance of the countries in the dyad, but not the importance of the third member with which 
the “contagiant” country (country j  in the contagion index equation) is signing agreements. In order to 
take this in account, we re-estimate the indexes, but now weighting the agreement with the third country 
by the exports shares of j to k.  We can see that main results hold, and the parameter associated to the 
index is bigger than in previous estimations, indicating that accounting for the commercial relevance of 
the third countries signing an FTA increase the level of contagion.  
Even when the estimations presented in table 5 are estimated using clusters at country-pair level, the 
structure of the variance-covariace matrix can be more complex, since each partner is at the time related 
with the rest of the countries. A dyadic regression like the one presented in Table 2 would solve the 
problem, but is difficult to implement such estimation in large panel data like our data. An alternative 
possibility is to apply a two-ways clustering procedure at both country partners in the dyad level. 
Column 8 of Table 5 presents the results applying this way of errors estimation, and the main results 
hold.   
 
21 Our first approach was to include the sum of FTA that a country has signed up to a given year, and 
its quadratic value, but collinearity problems arose from this measure. The threshold of 8 FTA was 
chosen because this is the median value of the sample, and because taken values in its vicinity leaves 
the results unchanged, while having values over 12 or 13 changed the other results in unexpected ways 
(and increase the correlation of the dummy with GDP per capita, democracy and the time trend).  19 
Table 5: Dynamic Determinants of FTA  
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
   new fta  new fta  new fta  new fta  new fta  new pure  new fta  2W Cluster  LPM 
Contagion Index (t-1) 0.0205*** 0.0183*** 0.0187*** 0.0506***
   (0.0018)  (0.0021)      (0.0042) (0.0101) 
Contagion Index (weights '76, t-1)  0.0197***        
   (0.0029)        
Contagion Index (weights '62, t-1)  0.0260***        
   (0.0051)       
Contagion Index (weights gravity, t-1)  0.0219***        
   (0.0032)       
Contagion Index (Pure FTA, t-1)  0.0210***      
   (0.0025)      
Contagion Index (with share of  j and k, t-1)    0.0500***  
    (0.0022)  
WTO Members  (detrended, t-1)  -0.104***  -0.113***  -0.133***  -0.0471  -0.115***  -0.238***  -0.128***  -0.112***  -0.0003*** 
    (0.0265)  (0.0279)  (0.0307)  (0.0401) (0.0280) (0.0324) (0.0273)  (0.0312)  (0.0001) 
WTO Round (t-1)  -0.327  -0.348  -0.382  -1.281*  -0.339  -0.437  -0.483**  -0.349 -0.00179*** 
   (0.2086)  (0.2173)  (0.2906)  (0.6657)  (0.2179)  (0.3328)  (0.2303)  (0.3072) (0.0006) 
Democracy (t-1)  0.0381***         
   (0.0108)         
Political Distance  (t-1)  -0.0691***  -0.0676*** -0.0138 -0.068***  -0.066***  -0.069***  -0.068*** -0.0198* 
   (0.0130)  (0.0161)  (0.0241)  (0.0132)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0201) (0.0105) 
Geographical Distance  -1.045***  -1.092***  -0.922***  -0.953***  -1.162***  -1.237***  -0.727***  -1.097***   
   (0.0752)  (0.0955)  (0.1281)  (0.1998)  (0.0957)  (0.1133)  (0.1051)  (0.1422)   
GDP  (t-1)  -0.0665  -0.0823* -0.147*** -0.169* -0.117** -0.0927 -0.00183  -0.0799 -0.0734 
   (0.0404)  (0.0500)  (0.0525)  (0.0902)  (0.0548)  (0.0572)  (0.0470)  (0.0646) (0.0740) 
GDP per capita (t-1)  0.0389***  0.0332***  0.0372***  0.0443***  0.0319***  0.0418***  -0.00445  0.0326** 0.0434*** 
   (0.0051)  (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0098)  (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0060)  (0.0146) (0.0105) 
GDP Growth (t-1)  -0.0420***  -0.0441***  -0.0381***  0.00170  -0.047***  -0.064***  -0.063***  -0.0444 -0.0426*** 
   (0.0093)  (0.0107)  (0.0118)  (0.0197)  (0.0110)  (0.0130)  (0.0124)  (0.0274) (0.0095) 
Trade with county partner over GDP (t-1)  0.0586***  0.0468***  0.0861***  0.0562***  0.0626***  0.0659***  0.0559** 0.0117 
   (0.0157)  (0.0158)  (0.0233)  (0.0159)  (0.0162)  (0.0140)  (0.0252) (0.0107) 
FTA Expertise   0.333***  0.316**  0.438  0.308**  0.812***  -0.156  0.331 0.140 
   (0.1230)  (0.1289)  (0.2739)  (0.1211)  (0.1574)  (0.1375)  (0.2867) (0.1040) 
Observations 115799 115799 80079 28092  115273 115799 115799 115799 88933
Countries 112  112  72  46  112  112  112  112 112 
Pseudo R
2 0.238  0.297  0.347  0.358  0.292  0.454  0.366    
Robust standard errors clustered over dyads in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Remoteness from rest of the world, product and difference of GDPs, six duration dependence splines, time trend, FTA density and dummies for transition from communism, military 
alliance, common language, common colonizer, former colonial relationship are included, but no showed in the table 20 
 
Up to now, in the analysis of dynamic of FTA some crucial time invariant controls have been used as 
controls in the panel regression -notably country’s distance-, but no dyad fixed effects have been used. 
Regarding the difficulties of include individual effects controls in unconditional logit estimates
22, one 
possible solution is to estimate a linear probability model (LPM) instead, with the well know problems 
of predicted values not lying between 0 and 1, but with the advantage of  allows to inclusion of dyadic 
fixed-effects using the within transformation. In Column 9 the LPM estimation of the model is 
presented, with the main variables maintaining the previous results, and the Contagion Index been 
positive and significant.  
 
A more suitable solution for the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects is the use of “conditional logit” 






When the conditional probability is different than 1, the logit function do not involve the fixed effects 
parameters and conventional Maximum Likelihood estimation can be perform. Then conditional logits 
will provide unbiased estimations of the parameters, but just for the sub-sample of dyads that switch 
status during the observed period, that is those that subscribe an FTA between 1977 and 2005.  
In the three firts columns of Table 7 we show the results of the conditional logit estimates for the 
undirected dyads for the symmetric indicators of contagion. Of those, the average and maximum 
indicator are positive and significative, but the one for minimum contagion is not significative. We 
control for the multilateral variables, that again have the opposite sign that predicted; for political 
distance, that in this case have the right sign but is not statically relevant; and for the product of the 
GDP  of countries in the dyad, that is positive and significative (at 5%).  
The last three columns of Table 7 perform the same previous robustness checks -now just for the 












                                                           
22 The inclusion of fixed effects by “brutal force” in the specification of Table 5 specification will 
imply the addition of around seven thousand dummies. An alternative way of include some sort of 
individual effects is the so-called a Mundlak-Chamberlain transformation, where averages of the time 
variant variables are included in the estimation. But the within variation of our main regressors, notably 
the Contagion Index, is not enough to implement the procedure.  21 
Table 7: Dynamic Determinants of FTA, Conditional Logit Estimates (Dyads Fixed Effects) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   All  FTA  All  FTA  All  FTA  All  FTA  All  FTA  Pure  FTA 
Contagion (average, t-1)  0.257**    
   (0.1027)    
Contagion (max, t-1)  0.265***    
   (0.0383)    
Contagion (min, t-1)  0.102    
   (0.0657)    
Contagion exports '76 (average, t-1)  0.198*    
   (0.1154)    
Contagion gravity (average, t-1)  0.353**    
   (0.1755)    
Contagion pure FTA (average, t-1)  0.222*** 
   (0.0316) 
WTO Members (t-1, detrended)  -0.0498**  -0.0374  -0.0322  -0.0675**  -0.0518**  0.0246 
    (0.0250) (0.0257) (0.0248) (0.0281) (0.0247) (0.0162) 
WTO Round (t-1)  -0.468**  -0.273*  -0.110  -0.812***  -0.347**  -0.0597 
    (0.1950) (0.1537) (0.1368) (0.1857) (0.1675) (0.1767) 
Political Distance  (t-1)  -0.0178  -0.0743 -0.0553 0.0130 -0.0403 0.0566 
    (0.0523) (0.0543) (0.0632) (0.0771) (0.0567) (0.0547) 
GDP product (t-1)  0.0121*  0.0143*  0.0224**  0.0200**  0.0104*  0.00196* 
    (0.0067) (0.0083) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0059) (0.0010) 
Observations  7332 7332 7332 5847 7268 8580 
Dyads  401 401 401 255 397 456 
Pseudo  R2  0.769 0.750 0.731 0.809 0.744 0.770 
Standard errors clustered over dyads in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Six duration dependence splines and a 




This preliminary draft presents evidence that contagion may be important in explaining the spread of 
regionalism. Our index of contagion is aimed at capturing the extent to which a nation can ‘catch’ the 
FTA ‘bug’ by trading with nations that sign many FTAs, especially those with important third-country 
trading partners. Two critiques of the current state of the work have been made clear to us. First, the 
contagion index is somewhat ad hoc. The solutions to this are to provide a firmer theoretical basis for it, 
and to try many other variants. Second, even we implemented several checks to solve potential 
endogeneity problems with the weights in the indexes, we have not done the same for the FTAs signed 
by third countries, something that requires the use of recent developments in spatial econometric 
techniques.  
In a subsequent version, we plan to redress these shortcomings.  23 
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Contagion Indicators (mean 2005) 
Average            Max                     Min
TOTAL  4661  134733    782         
Albania 57  484  1998  3  18.03 45.07  1.27
Algeria* 83  2492  1976  27  19.44 53.46  23.05
Argentina* 102  3287  1976  10  6.36 22.67  2.87
Armenia 55  723  1993  9  11.54 27.37  9.12
Australia* 106  3823  1976  7  11.27 25.76  6.82
Austria 111  3774  1976  34  26.69 57.65  22.23
Azerbaijan 68  585  1998  13  13.47 32.32  10.07
Bangladesh 98  3110  1976  6  7.81 21.83  2.2
Belarus 88  909  1997  11  11.44 31.18  7.85
Belgium* 111  1258  1997  36  23.56 50.36  1.94
Bolivia* 72  2147  1976  10  4.99 19.9  3.54
Brazil* 110  3794  1976  11  4.9 18.64  1.75
Bulgaria* 95  2386  1980  23  14.05 48.66  22.39
Burkina Faso  49  1637  1976  4  13.21 30.98  0.89
Cambodia 54  453  1998  6  8.98 23.16  3.53
Canada* 110  3775  1976  7  9.08 22.68  4.01
CAF 44  1563  1976  1  21.42 50.92  0.04
Chad 37  1083  1976  1  15.25 41.23  0.04
Chile* 92  2738  1976  30  27 65.29  20.59
China 111  3795  1976  12  4.15 15.33  3.18
Colombia* 92  3161  1976  19  6.6 21.25  3.21
Costa Rica*  73  2574  1976  12  6.23 22.51  3.27
Cyprus 94  2974  1976  22  20.71 49.22  24.2
Czech R.*  110  1551  1993  24  13.06 49.77  20.77
Denmark* 111  3921  1976  36  27.78 58.65  22.71
Ecuador* 79  2319  1976  10  4.37 16.05  3.55
Egypt* 100  3136  1976  33  21.57 51.23  20.81
El Salvador*  70  2060  1976  9  5.56 18.38  2.49
Estonia 87  1349  1993  22  20.44 57.19  30.21
Fiji 45  1861  1976  3  13.24 29.54  1.83
Finland 108  3736  1976  32  27.42 57.45  24.39
France* 111  3942  1976  36  24.47 52.51  20.86
Gabon 59  1835  1976  0  15.51 34.58  0.01
Gambia 53  1560  1976  3  17.69 42.82  0.46
Georgia 61  866  1992  11  19.59 49.63  8.89
Germany* 111  3960  1976  36  23.31 50.96  19.92
Ghana 73  2535  1976  6  10.72 29.64  0.3227 
Greece* 109  3693  1976  8  21.13 49.38  18.95
Guatemala* 71  2323  1976  8  5.64 17.93  2.1
Guinea 57  1640  1976  4  15.89 39.89  0.36
Guinea-Bissau 30  1027  1976  0  14.3 30.53  0
Guyana 50  1983  1976  4  9.84 26.27  1.7
Haiti 55  1937  1976  2  6.2 17.64  0.38
Honduras* 66  2223  1976  8  5.05 19.53  1.66
Hong Kong*  109  3768  1976  1  5.71 17.9  1.63
Hungary* 107  3071  1976  24  12.5 50  21.72
India 110  3748  1976  9  6.71 19.15  3.06
Indonesia* 110  3375  1976  6  4.11 11.7  2.58
Iran* 76  2449  1976  7  7.89 26.15  2.04
Ireland* 109  3783  1976  36  27.92 60.13  23.61
Israel 97  2754  1976  22  22.91 69.04  17.05
Italy* 111  3936  1976  36  25.05 53.52  21.17
Jamaica 69  2683  1976  6  7.29 23.73  1.27
Japan* 111  3917  1976  2  1.93 12.54  1.55
Jordan 86  2491  1976  24  21.25 66.3  16.98













Contagion Indicators (mean 2005) 
Average            Max                     Min
Kenya 74 2595 1976 6 9.18 24.65  1.74
Korea, South.*  109 3556 1976 5 4.85 13.95  1.98
Kyrqyz R.  59 730 1994 14 12.11 29.58  13.27
Latvia 83 1221 1992 22 20.37 55.9  31.44
Lithuania 83 1187 1992 22 20.77 55.18  33.13
Madagascar 61 2178 1976 2 12.58 34.71  1.31
Malawi 60 1851 1976 7 13.62 35.55  1.57
Malaysia 111 3655 1976 6 5.58 15.17  2.56
Mali 54 1632 1976 4 11.58 28.41  0.81
Mexico* 85 2884 1976 35 21.96 69.96  9.72
Moldova 59 750 1995 13 18.08 42.92  11.87
Morocco 77 2799 1976 21 19.68 53.04  27.83
Mozambique 52 1692 1976 4 15.8 36.12  1.3
Nepal 47 1320 1976 4 7.19 24.33  1.73
Netherlands* 111 3927 1976 36 26.11 57.33  22.53
New Zealand  96 3576 1976 6 5.29 17.49  2.83
Nicaragua* 66 1949 1976 8 7.22 17.95  2.37
Niger 55 1608 1976 4 17.53 44.52  0.36
Norway* 108 3790 1976 24 25.32 55.33  21.8328 
Pakistan 108 3554 1976 13 6.87 19.67  3.05
Panama* 79 2491 1976 7 5.19 20.72  1.06
Papua N. G.  48 1793 1976 3 10.32 22.89  1.81
Paraguay* 62 1969 1976 10 9.7 25.65  3.96
Peru* 86 2818 1976 10 5.91 20.44  2.71
Philippines* 95 3312 1976 6 5.94 16.7  2.69
Poland* 109 3342 1976 24 13.19 51.51  23.17
Portugal* 111 3719 1976 34 26.69 58.19  22.57
Romania 99 1534 1976 23 13.27 48.97  23.2
Russia 104 977 1998 11 8.99 22.89  2.49
Sierra Leone  47 1696 1976 3 15.53 38.85  0.42
Singapore* 98 3308 1976 14 8.22 33.59  9.31
Slovak R.  104 1572 1993 24 13.65 51.8  20.88
South Africa*  107 2837 1976 17 18.32 40.73  17.63
Spain* 111 3869 1976 34 25.03 54.65  21.26
Sri Lanka  86 2923 1976 6 7.67 21.5  2.53
Sweden* 110 3840 1976 34 26.22 55.82  21.43
Switzerland* 111 3858 1976 24 24.79 53.06  19.83
Syria 68 2145 1976 14 18.32 49.84  23.69
Tajikistan 53 436 1998 12 12.75 33.06  10.04
Tanzania 71 2246 1976 6 10.6 27.06  2.37
Thailand* 110 3640 1976 9 6.65 18.49  3.56
Togo 60 1915 1976 6 15.01 34.42  0.55
TrinidadTobago 74 2590 1976 6 4.42 14.02  1.42
Tunisia 92 2964 1976 22 14.96 54.32  22.39
Turkey* 110 3350 1976 27 24.62 52.87  22.07
Turkmenistan 60 503 1998 14 10.77 27.81  9.82
Uganda 53 1652 1976 5 11.85 34.74  1.97
Ukraine 79 1020 1993 11 14.87 34.9  7.98
UK* 111 3986 1976 36 23.59 50.21  17.97
USA* 111 1964 1976 16 2.38 17.66  3.31
Uruguay* 83 2721 1976 14 8.21 24.5  3.35
Uzbekistan 58 481 1998 15 12.71 30.78  11.76
Venezuela* 73 2520 1976 2 5.54 16.74  3.06
Vietnam 101 921 1998 3 5.66 15.08  0
Yemen 68 1136 1991 10 7.67 26.02  3.04
Zambia 62  2009 1976 0 12.83 28.54  1.82






APPENDIX 2: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Distance  Rose (2004).  
Remoteness  






With DCONT dummy for i and j same continent, tanking from the World Bank’s regions 
classification.   
GDP initial ratio 
and product 
To calculate the product and ratio of the GDP (logs) we use data from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators (WDI). For each country we use the oldest available data, 
starting in 1960 for old countries and the year of creation for new countries (in some 
exceptions the data just start later).  
capital/labour 
ratio 
Taken from Baier, S.L., Dwyer, G., Tamura, R., 2000. We use the oldest data available for 
each country. 
Common 
language  dummy for Common Language, Rose (2004).  
Common 
colonizer  Dummy for Common Colonizer after 1945, Rose (2004).  
Colony  Dummy for pairs ever in Colonial Relationship, Rose (2004).  
All FTA  
We use the newly built database available at the World Trade Institute (WTI). The data is 
based on historical notifications of the date the agreements entered into force and their 
contemporary participants. For more details: Hufbauer and Schott (2007) 
Export Shares 
UN Comtrade database (using the World Integrated Trade Solution of the World Bank), at 
the 1-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level. Whenever a country 





The data is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Democracy 
Captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The data comes from the Polity IV project, 
which publicly available data can be found 




UN Comtrade database (using the World Integrated Trade Solution of the World Bank), at 
the 1-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level. 
Military 
Alliance 
A dummy taken value one for any positive record in the variable “formal alliances” in 
Correlates of War database: http://www.correlatesofwar.org  Since the variable is just 
available up to 2000, we assumed that the values of the last year were the same for the 
missing period 2001-2004.  
Transition from 
communism  
We update the variable existent in M&R database, incorporating former Soviet republics 
and other countries not included in their sample.  
 
 
 
 